Germany. The econometric analysis has been carried out using panel data techniques, which allow to disentangle the effects of self-selection and legal impact of citizenship acquisition.
Introduction
The analysis of citizenship has had a long tradition within the moral and political theory. The socio-political importance of citizenship in the civic society has been emphasized amongst others by John Locke (1690) , who distinguishes between active and passive membership in a society. He argues that only the access to citizenship by explicit commitment and contract makes an individual a full member of a nation state. This position has by now been embraced by almost all legal systems of modern states, which differentiate their inhabitants into natives and foreigners. Although the process of acquiring citizenship differs between the various countries, citizenship in all states is connected with a number of legal rights. An example is the entitlement to vote, which is typically associated with citizenship in modern societies.
Consequently, naturalization, which is defined as the acquisition of citizenship of a country by a foreigner, can affect the socio-economic integration of immigrants in a country in various ways.
Whereas social scientists have spent significant efforts to analyse the political and sociological implications of naturalizations, economists have neglected this topic a long time. 1 One of the first economic studies that deal with the issue of citizenship is by Chiswick (1978) , who has analysed the economic assimilation of immigrants. Using cross-Sectional data from the U.S. census for the year 1970, Chiswick examines the assimilation process of immigrants by comparing the earnings of native and foreign-born men. Overall, Chiswick finds a positive effect of naturalization on earnings, which becomes insignificant when he controls for years of residence. In the following years, the economic literature on immigrant assimilation has mainly focused on skill and language acquisition. Recently, economists have renewed their interest in the topic of naturalizations. However, most of them have considered this issue in only the U.S. or Canada (see Bratsberg et al. 2002 , DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2005 , DeVoretz 2008 , Mazzolari 2009 ). For European countries, only a few empirical studies that analyse the economic impact of naturalizations exist, such as that by Kogan (2003) for Austria and Sweden, Bevelander and Veenman (2008) for the Netherlands and Scott (2008) for Sweden.
A drawback of most existing studies on the impact of naturalization is that they are based on cross-Sectional data, which does not allow to control for self-selection concerning unobservable characteristics within the group of immigrants. The study of Bratsberg et al. (2002) is the first to use cross-Sectional as well as longitudinal data to estimate the effect of 1 For a comprehensive overview of sociological studies about naturalizations, see Yang (1994) . naturalization on wage growth of foreign-born men. The authors show that naturalization has a significant positive effect on the earnings of immigrants even after controlling for differences in unobserved individual characteristics. Bratsberg et al. (2002) demonstrate that wage growth accelerates after the acquisition of citizenship, indicating the existence of barriers to entry in certain jobs for immigrants without U.S. citizenship. In his longitudinal analysis for Sweden, Scott (2008) finds mixed results about the effect of naturalization on wages of immigrants. In contrast to the findings of Bratsberg et al. (2002) , he concludes that the true naturalization premium of immigrants is largely caused by selection on the part of the individual and not by legal implications. Overall, the empirical evidence from longitudinal studies is scarce. In addition, the seminal work of Bratsberg et al. (2002) is based on small sample size and therefore does not allow to analyse the impact of naturalization by country of origin.
For the case of Germany, there is, until the present, no empirical evidence on whether the acquisition of citizenship has any effects on the labour market outcomes for immigrants.
Furthermore, the role of unobserved characteristics in explaining the naturalized immigrants` wage premium remains unclear. The purpose of this to paper is to address this question by estimating the impact of naturalization on wage growth of immigrants in Germany. The data used are actual register data obtained from the employment sample of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) covering more than 80% of the entire labour force in Germany.
The econometric analysis is carried out using panel data techniques, which enable to disentangle the effects of self-selection and the legal impact of citizenship acquisition.
Furthermore, the large sample size allows us to identify the impact of citizenship acquisition across different groups of immigrants.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents stylized facts on naturalization in Germany by outlining the legal framework and the quantitative dimension of the phenomenon. Section 3 contains some theoretical considerations about the relationship between legal status and labour market performance. The data set and selected descriptive statistics are presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains the results of the pooled and longitudinal estimations. In Section 6 we carry out a series of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the paper, discussing the policy implications of the analysis.
Naturalizations in Germany

Citizenship Law
Until the beginning of the 1990s, the German citizenship law was characterized by the principle of Jus Sanguinis, i.e. the principle of descent. According to this, citizenship is recognized for any individual born to a parent who is a national or citizen of Germany.
Furthermore, foreigners had no entitlement to naturalization derived from law. Neither birth nor prolonged residence in Germany established any right to avail German citizenship.
However, foreigners were able to acquire citizenship via discretionary decisions. This refers to situations in which citizenship is granted by public authorities without any subjective entitlement of the applicant. The difference to naturalizations based on entitlement is that citizenship acquisition may be denied even if the applicant fulfils all conditions specified in the law. Amongst these conditions were a minimum residence of 10 years, a sufficient income and the renouncement of previous citizenship. In addition to this, the law contained a provision which alleviates citizenship access for foreign spouses of Germans (see Brubaker 1992, pp. 77-84) .
With the beginning of the 1990s the legal provisions regarding naturalizations were liberalized for young immigrants (older than 18, younger than 23). Similar changes were implemented for immigrants who lived at least for 15 years in Germany (see Brubaker 1992, p. 78) . The legal situation in Germany changed substantially in 1999, when a fundamental reform of the citizenship law was conducted. The reform added the principle of Jus Soli to the existing law. Thanks to this reform, children of immigrants attain the German passport by birth if they are born in Germany. A special provision allows them to retain the citizenship of their parents until the age of 23. Before attaining this age, they have to decide between one of the two citizenships. This solution has been called the "option model". Furthermore, the new law entitles every immigrant to naturalization if she/he fulfils a number of requirements.
These requirements are: residence of at least 8 years in Germany, possession of an appropriate residence permit, sufficient knowledge of the German language, the ability to support themselves without recourse to social assistance or unemployment benefits, allegiance to German constitution and no serious criminal offences. Finally, they must also relinquish their previous citizenship.
2 During the preceding years, this has been the most frequently used channel by which immigrants naturalized in Germany (see Steinhardt 2007, pp. 544-545) .
2 For this requirement, there exist a set of exceptions.
Recently, Germany has implemented a standardized naturalization test, which is obligatory since September 2008 for all immigrants who desire to naturalize. The multiple choice test includes various questions on German history, geography, politics and society. Figure 1 shows the number of annual naturalizations in Germany during the period from 1975 to 2008. As it is clear from the figure, naturalizations played a minor role during the 1980s, with less than 50,000 naturalizations per year. From the beginning of the 1990s, the picture changes and the number of naturalizations increased continuously, with a peak in 1995, when 313,000 people acquired German citizenship. However, the overall figures include ethnic Germans, the so-called Spätaussiedler. These are immigrants of German origin from the former Soviet Union (see Steinhardt 2007, pp. 545-546 
Quantitative Dimension
Legal Status and Labour Market Performance
In the following Section, some theoretical arguments are discussed to explain why naturalization could change the economic well-being of an immigrant. Because in many cases, the effect depends strongly on the legal requirements and consequences of naturalization within a country, the following discussion refers explicitly to the situation in
Germany. In our analysis we distinguish between three groups of immigrants working and living in Germany: citizens of the EU or associated states, Turkish immigrants and so called Third Country Nationals (TCNs). Latter refers to foreigners with a nationality of a country which neither belongs to the European Union nor has any bilateral agreements with Germany regarding labour market access (e.g. Iran, Lebanon, and Egypt). The legal status and labour market access differ strongly among the three groups: immigrants belonging to the first group have in principle the same rights like German employees. Turkish immigrants enjoy privileged access to the German labour market, but the treatment still differs from EU immigrants in various ways. Third Country Nationals face strong legal restrictions for labour market access. In general, they are still subject to the recruitment ban, although several exceptions exist which allow them to take up employment in Germany under certain conditions (see Hailbronner 2007, pp. 8-12 ).
The first obvious channel by which naturalization can affect productivity is unrestricted access to the labour market (see Yang 1994, pp. 452-453; Bratsberg 2002, pp. 569-570) . Due to legal reasons, access to a number of jobs in the public sector requires the possession of a German passport. For example, jobs in the justice, national defence, and administrative departments are generally reserved for German citizens. 6 To some extent, this also holds true for certain jobs within the independent personal services, including practices such as dentists, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers and architects. However, these restrictions do not apply to European citizens. 7 Furthermore, numerous jobs require unrestricted mobility of employees without any bureaucratic hurdles. This is especially related to jobs in the transport sector or cross-border services that are associated with a high frequency of travel. For this reason, the possession of the German passport is not a legal engagement criterion, but a functional precondition. Therefore, naturalization reduces institutional and functional labour market barriers and enables a free job choice of immigrants.
In addition to this, naturalization can lead to a reduction of costs from the perspective of the employer. In the case of foreign employees with a temporary work or residence permit, this cost reduction occurs in two modes. First, naturalization results in a decline in the administrative costs of the employer. This is caused by the fact that the administrative effort of the employer for foreign workers is in this case significantly higher than for workers with a German passport. For instance, an employer who wants to engage a foreigner from outside
Europe has always to conduct a so-called priority test, which ensures that no national or
European worker is available to do the job (see Hailbronner 2007, pp. 17-18) . 8 This issue has already been raised by the German Federal Government in its annual report in 2000, when it pointed out that some employers abstain from employing foreigners due to legal and bureaucratic hurdles. Second, naturalization reduces the transaction costs of the employer (see Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004) . From the perspective of the employer, a German passport alleviates the insecurity about the individual and occupational future of the employees, because it guarantees that the employed immigrant has the right to live and work permanently in Germany. Both these arguments imply that an employer, who has a choice between two job applicants with equal qualifications and skills, prefers the one with the German passport.
In the literature about the effect of naturalization impacts, the first component of this cost reduction argument has already been addressed (see Bratsberg et al. 2002, p. 569; Mazzolari 2009, p. 180) . In general, it is associated with the phenomenon of discrimination. However, following Becker's (1973 pp. 13-17) definition, this behaviour of the employer cannot be judged as discriminatory. The higher administrative costs of foreign employees are an objective reason to prefer employees with a German passport. Despite this, it has to be assumed that some employers have a taste for discrimination, which sums up to the market wage rate (see Becker 1973, pp. 39-40) . However, in contrast to the United States, by law legally employed foreigners in Germany are treated equal to natives in the job. This is true for aspects of both employment provisions and trade union agreements (see Hailbronner 2007, p. 20) . To sum up, naturalization can increase the labour market opportunities of an employee with migration background in several ways. Due the existing provisions regarding the free mobility of workers within the EU, the distinction is to a lesser extent about having a German or a foreign nationality, but about being an EU citizen or a TCN.
Furthermore, naturalization provides job relevant information to the employer. With the decision to naturalize, the individual expresses his wish to live permanently in Germany, demonstrates sufficient language skills, proves that he has already lived for a number of years within the country, commits to the German constitution, and has been able to support himself without needing social assistance or unemployment benefits prior to naturalization. This information is, in general, positively reviewed by the employer since it documents a certain degree of identification and integration. Because an employer cannot observe the productivity of an employee, every transaction on the labour market is connected with an extent of uncertainty from the perspective of the employer before hiring. For this reason, an employer uses the observable characteristics of a job applicant to estimate the conditional probability of competence (see Spence 1974, pp. 5-9) . These characteristics can be all the information about the individual to which the employer has access prior to hiring. In general, these are education, employment history and personal characteristics. Whereas some of these characteristics, e.g. education, are partially or completely controllable by the individual, others are not (e.g. gender). From the perspective of the employee, it is reasonable to make those adjustments that will improve his or her position in the job lottery (see Spence 1974, pp. 9-14) . The citizenship status is a personal characteristic, which can be altered by an individual, and which conveys significant information potential if it is not determined by birth. The naturalization act therefore can be interpreted as a signalling device, which can be used by employers for selection purposes. In this way, naturalization may also help to reduce statistical discrimination. First evidence from a field experiment for France indicates that having French nationality improves the chances to get an invitation for a job interview (see Duguet et al. 2007 ).
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An aspect by which the productivity can increase directly is connected to the location decision of naturalized employees. In almost all cases, immigrants who naturalize have already decided in advance that they stay in Germany over a longer period or for lifetime. In general, this long-term location decision encourages immigrants to foster their investment in education, language, and country specific skills (see Mincer and Polachek 1974) . The accumulation of human capital should have a positive impact on the labour market performance and should lead to assimilation in earnings to natives. The following empirical analysis will try to address these different impact channels by integrating the time dimension explicitly in the analysis. If naturalization has a positive impact on labour market 9 To the knowledge of the author no other field experiment on ethnic discrimination compares immigrants with and without citizenship.
opportunities, naturalized employees should exhibit some change in their labour market performance after the naturalization. If, on the other hand, the investment in country-specific human capital affects the productivity positively, naturalized employees should also feature stronger wage growth before the acquisition of German citizenship.
Data and descriptive statistics
The data is from the current version of the employment sample of the IAB, which is a 2 percent random sample of all employees in Germany covered by social security during the period 1975 to 2004. According to this restriction, the sample includes no self-employed persons, family workers and civil servants. Overall, the dataset covers more than 80% of the whole labour force in Germany. The sample contains various sociodemographic characteristics at the individual level, such as daily wage, education and age (see Bender and Haas 2002) . In our analysis we focus on full-time employed men. We therefore exclude parttime employees, unemployed persons, trainees and persons with wages below the limit for social insurance contributions. 10 The restriction to men becomes necessary because of the significant differences between men and women concerning their employment history.
The legal basis of the dataset is the integrated reporting procedure regarding pension, unemployment and health insurance. The data are therefore highly reliable in comparison to survey data. 11 However we have to consider, that the reliability differs between particular variables. Generally, it can be distinguished between characteristics that are collected for insurance purposes (e.g. wage, employment duration), and information that has only a statistical use (e.g. education). Characteristics of the first category are related to payments to the social security system. The corresponding declarations of the employer are checked by the social insurance companies, the pension fund and the employment agencies through various plausibility tests. In contrast to this, the reliability of the statistical characteristics related to the employee relies nearly completely on the accuracy of the employer. Imprecise data entry is enforced by the fact that the reporting person changes with every new job of an individual.
In general, two types of errors are possible: wrong information is recorded or wrong information is transferred (see Drews 2006, pp. 4-6) . This leads to some inconsistency in the 10 The wages of the latter group are initially recorded in 1999. 11 The reporting procedure demands from every employer that he notifies all employees who are subject to social security contributions within a certain time limit to the social insurance carriers. The data collection is a multistage process beginning with the employer reporting the information to the insurance companies. Subsequently, the data is submitted to the pension funds, which in turn send selected variables to the employment agency. These data is then used to construct the employment sample ( Furthermore, we exclude native employees from our data set. 19 The same holds true for employees who change from a foreign nationality to another alien citizenship at a certain point of time or who expatriate. In addition to this, we removed employees who naturalize in
2004. This step is considered necessary given that we aim to estimate the impact of naturalization over time. Subsequently, the dataset contains only records of employees who have a foreign nationality throughout the observation period and foreign employees who naturalize at a certain point of time. 20 After this, cross-Sections are drawn for every year. This is carried out by using the annual notification of an employee at the end of every year, whereby only the information related to the main job is recognized. This ensures that every employee who works in two subsequent years is accounted for. Thus, the dataset contains, at the most, one notification per year for every employee. The final structure of the dataset is an unbalanced panel.
Due to the anonymization process the dataset provides no information about the age of employees who are, at a certain point of time, older than 62 or younger than 15. These people are marked throughout the entire data set with the category names "older than 62" or "younger than 15". Therefore, an algorithm to approximate the age of these employees has been developed and implemented, which allows us to include these employees in our analysis. 21 Regarding the education variable we make use of an imputation procedure developed by Fitzenberger et al. (2006) . 22 Furthermore, we have to deal with the issue of right-censored wages. Since the IAB employment sample data is generated from the social insurance accounts wages are only displayed up to the contribution limit of the social security.
To avoid biased estimates a two-step procedure based on the approach of Gartner (2005) is implemented to impute the censored wages. 23 The Euro is selected as the uniform currency.
Wages are deflated by using the consumer price index on the basis 2000.
19 A native employee is herby defined as an individual who possesses a German passport throughout the entire observation period 20 Before 1999 ethnic Germans, the so-called Aussiedler, have received the German citizenship without any precondition shortly after entering the country. Since 1999 they received the German passport automatically as soon as they entered Germany (see Steinhardt 2007) . Our final data set therefore should contain no ethnic Germans. 21 For employees marked younger than 15, the date of birth is identified by subtracting 15 years from the first year of coverage, while the date of birth of employees marked elder than 62 is calculated by subtracting 65 years from the last year of coverage. The presumption underlying this procedure is that nobody younger than 14 or older than 65 years is included in the sample. 22 We decided to use imputation procedure 1 (IP1), which allows extrapolating degrees without any restrictions (see Fitzenberger et al. 2006 ). This procedure corrects amongst others for cases in which the educational achievement of employees decreases over time due to misreporting. 23 In a first step the wage is estimated by a tobit-regression. The dependent variables are, among others, education, experience, occupational status, and economic sector. In a second step the censored wages are
One characteristic of the IABS is that it contains no variable describing the work experience of an employee. We decided to use the age of an employee as a proxy for his work experience. We further calculated an alternative experience measure based on the number of working days recorded in the sample. However, we prefer the first measure due to two reasons: Firstly, the average age of entry in the sample is for immigrants about 30. We therefore have to assume that most of the immigrants already have worked in their home country or even in Germany in jobs not covered by the social security system (e.g. part-time work, self-employed). Secondly, due to the sample construction of the IABS the dataset On average, each employee is observed 8.8 times during the entire observation period.
Whereas the minimum is 1 observation per person, the maximum observation period is 30 years. Concerning the differences between non-naturalized and naturalized immigrants, the latter group has a higher average observation period, which is beneficial for disentangling the wage growth pre-and post naturalization. Table 2 shows selected individual characteristics of foreign and naturalized employees in the final year of the observation period. The figures clearly indicate that naturalized employees imputed by adding an error term ε with the standard deviation σ to the expected wage. For the error term we take random drawings from a truncated normal distribution (see Gartner 2005) .
possess a higher qualification profile than employees who retain their foreign nationality.
While for example 30% of foreign employees recorded no apprenticeship, only 18% of the naturalized employees had no professional education. These results are consistent with other evaluations for Germany based on different data sources, such as the Microcensus (see Steinhardt 2007, p. 548) . Furthermore, it becomes obvious that naturalized immigrants are on average 3.5 years older than foreign employees. This is driven by the fact that naturalization in the majority of the cases takes place between the age of 30 and 50. The discrepancy in the formal qualification of the two groups corresponds to differences in the occupational status (see lower part of table 2). The vast majority of the foreign employees are unskilled workers. The corresponding share within naturalized employees is with 45% considerably lower. On the other hand, about 19% of the foreigners are white collar employees, whereas almost every fourth naturalized immigrant belongs to this category. The table further shows that, on average, naturalized immigrants earn higher wages than foreign employees. With almost 4.5 Euros, the wage premium is quite substantial. This corresponds to large sociodemographic differences between the two groups.
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The descriptive findings indicate that immigrants are likely to be positively selected with respect to human capital. In addition to this, it has to be assumed that the probability for naturalization also varies with unobservable characteristics. Immigrants with positive unobservable characteristics, such as motivation or ambition, should have a higher preference for naturalization. The following empirical analysis therefore has to consider processes of self-selection on both observables and unobservables. In the next Section several econometric specifications will be estimated to analyse the relationship between naturalization and wages.
Results
The following estimations are based on a standard Mincer wage equation derived from human capital theory (see Mincer 1974) . In this type of regression, the most important independent variables are education and labour market experience. Furthermore, we control for various sociodemographic and labour market characteristics. In the first part of the empirical analysis, a simple pooled OLS regression is carried out to gain initial insights about the impact of naturalization on wages. All observations are pooled together without taking the panel structure of the data into account. Therefore, this basic regression does not allow to control for processes of selection concerning unobservable characteristics.
The basic regression is given by the following equation:
(1) ln w it = α 0 + α 1 N it +α 2 ED it + α 3 EX it + α 4 EX 2 it + α 5 Y t + β Z it + ε it where the dependent variable ln w it describes the average daily real wage of individual i at time t in logarithms. The naturalization of an individual is captured by the term N it , which is a dummy that indicates whether an employee is naturalized at time t. It is not only set to unity in the year when the naturalization takes place, but also in all years after the naturalization act.
This term captures the advantage of employees who acquired German citizenship. ED it and
EX it describe the education and labour market experience of individual i over time. The inclusion of the term Y t , which is a time dummy, allows to control for cyclical effects on the dependent variable. The term Z it is a vector of further control variables containing individual and macro characteristics, such as nationality, economic sector and region. 25 Table 5 shows the results for the basic pooled OLS regression.
The variable of interest N it is significant and has the expected sign. Because the basic reference category of the nationality variable is Third Country National, the results can be interpreted as follows: once we control for differences in human capital, naturalized employees earn 4.49% higher wages than Third Country Nationals. 26 The addition of occupational control variables reduces the size of the coefficient as expected. Finally, remains a significant wage advantage of naturalized immigrants over Third Country Nationals of 2.40%. However, occupational status and actual occupation could be already an outcome of naturalization. 27 Therefore we should treat these variables as endogenous and refrain from including them at the right hand side of the equation. In this case we should refer to the result in column 4 which give us a wage premium of 4.81%. The results of the pooled OLS indicate that the wage premium of naturalized foreigners can be to some extent be explained by differences in observable characteristics such as education and labour market experience. that the estimation should indeed account for unobserved heterogeneity of the individuals (see Wooldridge 2002, pp. 264-265) . We further ran a Hausman Test, which tests for a correlation between the time-constant error term and the exogenous variables (see Wooldridge 2002, pp. 251-252) . 28 The result of the test supports the use of individual fixed effects. Following Bratsberg et al. (2002) , a longitudinal analysis based on the following equation is carried out:
(2) ln w it = α 0 + α 1 N it + α 2 N it (EX it -EX iN )+ α 3 CA i EX it + α 4 ED it + α 5 EX it + α 6 EX 2 it + α 7 Y t + β Z it + µ i + ε it with µ i describing the individual specific time invariant component of the error term and ε it is an idiosyncratic disturbance. The inclusion of µ i ensures that we control for unobserved individual heterogeneity such as ability or motivation. 29 The term CA i is a time-constant dummy set to unity if the employee i naturalizes at a certain point during the observation period. EX it denotes the labour market experience of the individual at time t, and EX iN describes the experience of individual i at the time of the naturalization act.
In addition to the former equation, this approach allows to differentiate the effect of naturalization by time. The inclusion of the additional terms allows us to make detailed statements about the question by which channel the naturalization affects wages: If α 1 is positive, there is an immediate positive wage effect. In the case of a positive α 2 , the wage growth after naturalization is accelerated. Both outcomes could be explained by increased labour market opportunities as a result of possessing German citizenship. In the case of a positive α 3 , the wages of naturalized employees grow faster even before the naturalization act.
This can be explained with an increased investment in human capital even prior to naturalization (see Bratsberg et al. 2002, p. 573) . Table 4 presents estimates of the three coefficients of equation (2) exploiting the whole data set. The results indicate that naturalization has an immediate positive effect on the wages of employees. 30 Naturalization leads to a statistically significant 0.65% boost in wages. In addition to this, the estimation shows that naturalized employees exhibit a rapid wage growth in the years after naturalization. Wage growth after naturalization is 0.41 percentage points 28 Both test statistics are in the appendix. 29 The individual specific term also controls implicitly for cohort-effects. 30 The regression also includes dummies for EU ascension and the signing of bilateral agreement (see appendix). Due to the nature of our measure of potential experience it is not possible to include a full set year dummies (see Wooldridge 2006, p. 489) . We could instead use T-2 year dummies under the identification restriction that the additional omitted year dummy has no impact on our dependent variable. However, various regressions have shown that the assumption does not hold true in our case. We therefore decided to control for time effects by using 6 quinquennial dummies (1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, and 2000-2004) .
higher per year. Reconsidering the fact that a foreign employee is on average 39 years old when he acquires the status of a German citizen reveals that the effect after naturalization is rather large. Both results are consistent with the argument that naturalization increases the labour market opportunities of immigrants in various ways. On the other hand, the results do not provide any evidence for accelerated wage growth prior to naturalization. The experienceearnings profile prior to naturalization seems not be steeper than the one of immigrants who
do not naturalize at all. Standard errors in parentheses robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Regressions also include tenure and its square, controls for federal states and economic sector, dummies for EU ascension/ bilateral agreement and quinquennial time dummies (reference category 1975-1979) . ** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level rounded to 4 decimal place Source: own calculations with data of the IAB employment sample As we outlined in Section 3.3 we distinguish between three groups of immigrants in the German labour market. Due to differences in legal status and labour market access we expect that the impact of naturalization varies among these groups. We therefore estimated equation (2) The results for selected groups of immigrants highlight two features: the removal of existing labour market barriers and the change in legal status is an important channel by which naturalization affects the productivity of immigrants. Immigrants from the EU who enjoy unrestricted labour market access even without the German passport exhibit no wage gains from the acquisition of German citizenship. On the other hand, Third Country Nationals and Turks who both have to deal with constraints in the labour market appear to profit by the naturalization act. Furthermore, the difference in the magnitude of the post-naturalization coefficient between both groups indicates that the impact of naturalization goes beyond the removal of institutional disadvantages. As we know from the literature Turks are likely to be faced with discrimination in the German labour market (see Goldberg et al. 1996, Kaas and Manger 2010) . Kaas and Manger (2010) demonstrate in a recent field experiment that discrimination of Turkish job applicants is reduced with the amount of information provided by the job applicants. As we argued in Section 3, the naturalization act contains a lot of valuable information for the employer and is therefore likely to increase the job chances of immigrants. The large impact of citizenship acquisition on future wage growth of Turks may therefore be due to the fact that naturalization helps to overcome statistical discrimination via signalling.
Robustness Checks
In this Section we test the robustness of our results in a number of ways. We start by adding the regional unemployment rate as an additional explanatory variable to equation (2). The corresponding results are provided in the second column of table 6, while the first column shows the results from our benchmark specification in table 4. 31 It becomes obvious that the inclusion of region-specific trends neither changes the significance nor the magnitude of our post-naturalization coefficient. However, our coefficient of Naturalized becomes insignificant and the Experience coefficient gains in size. Second, we used an alternative measure of work experience which is the sum of age at sample entry and working days recorded in the sample (see as well Section 4). This specification yields as well a positive and significant coefficient for Experience since Naturalization; however the coefficient decreases in size. The other coefficients react in a similar way like in the first robustness check. As a third robustness test we included education as a further control in our benchmark. As a result, our coefficient for We turn next to consider in table 7 various robustness checks regarding the sample composition. In column (1) we restrict our sample to employees who have at least eight observations during the observation period. It becomes obvious that our main result of a positive wage impact after naturalization is not been driven by employees with a minor number of observations. However, our coefficient of Naturalization turns insignificant. The same holds true if we focus on employees who are not older than 25 when they enter the 31 The used regional unemployment measure relates only to immigrants and is calculated on the basis of the IABS. 32 The education dummies are significant and positive.
sample (column 2). Our coefficient for Experience since Naturalization remains significant and increases in size like the one for Experience of non-naturalized immigrants. Since we have restricted our sample to immigrants who had little or no labour market experience before entering the sample we are now able to use experience solely based on sample spells. The results in column (3) reveal that naturalization positively affects wage growth after naturalization. And once again we get a positive, but insignificant coefficient for Naturalization. Finally, we focus on individuals which are at least 30 years old when they enter the sample. This should ensure that we exclude native born second-generation immigrants, in particular children of guest-workers. 33 The results in column 4 show that our main result holds true if we only compare non-naturalized and naturalized immigrants who are both likely to be born outside of Germany. Overall, the alternative specifications have
shown that the result of a positive impact of citizenship on wage growth is robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables, alternative experience measures and changes in the sample composition. On the other hand, the additional estimations do not support the result of a direct positive wage response to naturalization. 
Conclusions
The analysis of the impact of naturalization has shown that citizenship is an economically relevant factor in Germany. The descriptive analysis exhibits a sizable wage premium for naturalized immigrants, but indicates that educational differences between naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants are an important determinant. It has become obvious that especially high qualified foreigners tend to naturalize. The estimation of a pooled OLS reveals that the wage premium of naturalized foreigners can be partly explained by differences in sociodemographic characteristics.
The longitudinal analysis, which enables us to control for self-selection concerning unobservable characteristics within the foreign workforce, demonstrates that the acquisition of citizenship has a positive impact on wages of immigrants. In particular, the fixed effects estimation shows that naturalized employees exhibit an accelerated wage growth in the years after the naturalization event. This result is robust to alternative specifications of the empirical model as well as to changes in the sample composition. Furthermore, the analysis highlights that the impact of becoming German varies across different groups of immigrants. While we do not find any impact for immigrants from EU or associated states, both Third Country nationals and Turks profit from acquiring German citizenship. We further find that the wage impact of naturalization has the largest size for Turkish immigrants. This supports our argument that naturalization can help to overcome statistical discrimination via signalling.
The findings of the analysis have clear implications for the integration policy in Germany.
Until now, there was no empirical evidence for the role that naturalization plays in the economic assimilation process of immigrants. Our results now clearly demonstrate for the first time that naturalization has a significant impact on the assimilation in earnings. The argument that naturalization designates the end of a successful integration process is hereby falsified. Undisputedly, the naturalization act demands already certain integration from the immigrant, but it also enables to further integration by increased labour market opportunities.
Therefore, naturalization is neither the beginning nor the end of integration, but an important part within the integration process. Policy makers can react to these findings by two ways:
first by allowing unrestricted labour market access for all immigrants legally residing in Germany, irrespective of their passport. The other well-known solution would be to increase the naturalization rates, which are relatively low compared to other European countries. This
